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ABSTRACT
We analyze firm’s tax choices facing a withholding and enforcement regime with a focus on
three mechanisms of bunching: (i) transaction costs, (ii) withholding threshold as a reference
point for taxpayer that creates a kink due to loss aversion, and (iii) withholding threshold as
a reference point for audit (audit trigger model). The transaction costs model predicts that
none of the firms that bunch at the withholding threshold would declare higher taxes when
withholding rate is increased, as was the case in Ecuador in 2007. Evidence from a triple-
difference research design shows higher tax payments by these firms. A prospect theoretic model
with the power value function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) does not generate bunching at
the withholding threshold. While linear prospect theory (LPT) can generate bunching under
certain conditions, it also yields testable predictions that are not consistent with the behavior of
a significant proportion of firms. Under the LPT, given an enforcement and withholding regime,
if a firm bunches in one year it should also bunch in all the following years, or if it unbunches
in a following year, it should declare taxes less than the withheld amount. The evidence from
panel data on the universe of all corporations in Ecuador shows very low persistence in bunching:
conditional on bunching at least once, only 3-4 percent firms bunch every year before changes
in the withholding rate, and among the firms that unbunch 35-40 percent declare taxes more
than the withheld amount, thus contradicting the LPT model for a substantial proportion of the
firms. Using the Sasabuchi t test as developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010), we find that the
relation between probability of bunching and assets of a firm is inverted-U which is consistent
with the audit trigger model. The evidence suggests that the behavior of the firms cannot be
captured by a single model. The strength of enforcement is important in determining bunching
in an LPT model which suggests cross-country differences in the role played by loss aversion in
bunching of taxpayers at policy thresholds.
Keywords: Loss Aversion, Reference Dependence, Transaction Costs, Audit Trigger, Bunch-
ing, Withholding, Firms, Profit Tax, Tax Evasion, Ecuador
JEL Codes: H25, H26, O23, O12
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1. Introduction
Income tax withholding at the source by an employer has a long history, and it is now
a prominent feature of tax administration in almost all developed and developing countries.2
Recent work by Saez et al. (2016) has underscored the importance of withholding at source
and third-party reporting in understanding the puzzle of “over compliance” in modern tax
administration. While from its inception, withholding as a tax enforcement tool has primarily
been applied to employment income, in many developing countries withholding has become an
important instrument for ensuring compliance by the small firms and self employed where a fixed
percentage of a firm’s sales are withheld at the time a transaction is made, and then transmitted
to the tax authority.3 Unlike other widely-discussed features of tax system such as tax brackets
and VAT exemption, withholding does not affect tax liability, and thus is irrelevant for the
decisions of taxpayers in the standard Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model. However, withholding
may affect a firm’s tax compliance because it creates a threshold. The observation that thresholds
in the tax system can affect tax reporting and distort economic decisions by creating kinks and
notches has been the focus of a growing theoretical and empirical literature (for excellent surveys,
see Slemrod (2016), Kleven (2016)).
We make two contributions to this literature. First, we develop models and derive testable
implications of a firm’s tax choices faced with a withholding and enforcement regime that focus
on three mechanisms of bunching: (1) transaction costs, (2) withholding threshold as a refer-
ence point for audit, and (3) withholding threshold as a reference point for the taxpayer that
generates a kink in the preference due to loss aversion. Second, we use rich panel data on the
universe of corporations from Ecuador with quasi-experimental variation in withholding rates
to discriminate among alternative models. The focus of the literature has been on what we
can learn from the bunching of firms at the withholding threshold (more broadly, at a policy
threshold); we show that much can be learned from the unbunching behavior of the firms that
2Withholding or “taxation at source” was introduced first in England when income tax was reenacted in 1803.
The principle of “taxation at source” was designed to tackle “the gross fraud and evasion” that characterized the
first income tax introduced in 1799 (see Sabine, 1966).
3Tax withholding and various forms of presumptive taxation have been adopted in many developing countries
because of the difficulties in tax enforcement with large informal sector and weak information base (Emran and
Stiglitz (2005, 2007), Soos (2003)).
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bunch in one year but not in another, without any change in the enforcement regime or the
withholding rate (more broadly, without changes in the rules of the game).
Since the withheld amount can act as a natural reference point when a firm decides its tax
declarations, we develop a model of tax evasion with reference dependence, loss aversion, and
diminishing sensitivity. Withholding cannot generate bunching of tax payments in a Prospect
theoretic model with standard S-shaped power utility function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Bunching due to loss aversion and reference dependence can occur in a linear prospect theory
(henceforth LPT) model where preference is piece-wise linear in both the losses and the gains
domains under the following conditions: (i) there exists a subset of firms with true tax liability
higher than the withheld amount, (ii) the strength of tax enforcement falls in an intermedi-
ate regime, (ii) the degree of loss aversion is high enough, given an enforcement regime. An
important implication is that the likelihood of bunching by taxpayers due to loss aversion and
reference dependence will vary across countries because of differences in the tax administration,
and the probability of bunching due to tax evasion is likely to be lower in developing countries
with weak tax administration. We develop a set of testable predictions implied by kinked linear
preference that focuses on the intertemporal behavior of the economic agents who bunch at the
withholding threshold, and take advantage of the panel data to test them.
The possibility that the withholding threshold may be a reference point primarily for tax
enforcement, instead of the taxpayer, has received relatively little attention in the literature. A
withholding threshold may affect the monitoring of firms by tax authority in a discontinuous
fashion, because tax devolutions (when tax liability is lower than withheld funds) usually result in
higher audit probabilities for a firm in many developing countries.4 We extend the Allingham-
Sandmo model to incorporate differential audit probability across the withholding threshold
(called the Audit Trigger model and denoted as the AT model for short), and show that the
audit trigger may induce firms to bunch the tax payments at around the withholding threshold.5
A third mechanism behind bunching is transaction costs: some firms that expect positive
4As noted by Andreoni et al. (1998), many tax agencies follow a cut-off rule, and concentrate their audit
resources below the cut-off. The withholding threshold may act as a focal point for establishing such a cut-off
for auditing the firms.
5While the possibility that a refund claim can increase audit probability has been noted in the literature, to
our knowledge, there is no formal model.
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refunds may forgo the refund if the transactions costs of claiming refund is large enough. In
contrast to prospect theory and audit trigger models, bunching in this case does not indicate
tax evasion by firms.
For our empirical analysis, a central identification challenge is that, in cross-section surveys,
it is difficult to identify bunching that is due to evasion rather than over-reporting, and to isolate
them from lumps in the firm distribution caused by technological and economic factors unrelated
to withholding. Withholding requirements in Ecuador vary across industries and over time: for
some industries (manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade and retail) they increased
from 1 to 2 percent in June 2007; for other industries (transportation) they remained unchanged
at 1 percent. The evidence presented below shows that bunching around the withholding rate (of
1 percent) is clearly observed in 2004-2006, i.e., before the policy change. More important is the
finding that the pattern radically changes in 2007 only for those industries where withholding
rates were raised, implying that bunching is primarily due to optimizing choices of the firms.6
A testable implication of the null hypothesis of bunching due to transaction costs is that the
firms situated around the 1 percent threshold before the policy reform should not increase their
tax payments in 2007. The evidence from a triple-difference research design is opposite: these
firms increased their tax payments in 2007. The higher tax payments observed in 2007 for the
firms located at around the 1 percent threshold in 2006 is, however, consistent with both the
audit trigger (AT) and linear prospect theory (LPT) models.
The LPT (Linear Prospect Theory) model of evasion implies that bunching by firms at
the withholding threshold is extremely persistent over time if the enforcement regime and the
withholding rate remain unchanged. In this model, an initially-bunched firm can unbunch in
the following years only if it experiences a specific type of shock switching its true refund from
negative to positive.7 Our analysis shows that such a firm will declare tax payments to the left
6The withholding rate was changed in July 2007. For the affected firms, during the first half of the year
2007 the withholding rate was 1 percent, while during the second half it was 2 percent. Thus one should not
expect any bunching around 1 percent or 2 percent thresholds for the year 2007. Also, if bunching around a new
threshold requires adjustments, for example, in accounting data, then there can be slow response, and one should
observe a similar bunching only after some years of the change in the threshold. Before 2007, the withholding
rates remained unchanged since 1989.
7In the LPT model, a firm’s tax payments can bunch at the withholding threshold only if its true tax refund
is negative, i.e., the true liability is higher than the withheld amount.
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of the withholding threshold. In contrast, under the null hypothesis that the observed bunching
in a given year is due to the change in the audit rate across the threshold, an initially-bunched
firm can unbunch irrespective of whether the shock to profits is positive or negative, and some
of the unbunching firms are likely to declare taxes higher than the withheld amount. We use a
rich panel data set for 2004-2006 when the withholding rate and the enforcement regime were
unchanged to test the null hypothesis of persistence due to loss aversion in an LPT model.
The evidence shows that, among the firms that bunch at least once, only 3-4 percent of firms
bunched in all three years (2004, 2005, 2006) before the increase in the withholding rate in 2007.
This is inconsistent with the prediction of strong intertemporal persistence in bunching. Among
the firms that unbunch, 35-40 percent declare taxes more than the withheld amount which is
impossible under the LPT model, but is consistent with the AT (Audit Trigger) model. The
evidence thus suggests that the behavior of a subset of firms is not consistent with the widely-
used linear preference prospect theory model with loss aversion and reference dependence.8
We provide additional evidence consistent with the AT (Audit Trigger) model by exploiting
a substantial body of theoretical literature and empirical evidence that firm size (measured in
terms of assets) is negatively correlated with risk averseness of a firm (Herranz et al. (2015),
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2013)). Under the null hypothesis that the audit trigger model is correct,
the firms in the middle of the asset size distribution are the most likely to bunch, implying that
the relation between the assets and propensity to bunch is inverted U shaped. In contrast, only
the largest firms bunch under the prospect theory model, because linear preference is likely to be
a good approximation for the largest firms with diversified portfolio. We find that the probability
of bunching is marginally smaller for the large firms when compared to the other firms, and the
estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. A formal test using a method developed
by Lind and Mehlum (2010) that can discriminate between a monotonic concave relation and
an inverted-U relation finds evidence consistent with the audit trigger model.
8Our finding that, for a substantial proportion of firms, bunching at the withholding threshold in Ecuador is
not likely to be due to loss aversion is different from the recent evidence in the context of Sweden and USA that
finds an important role for loss aversion for individual taxpayers (Engstrom et al. (2015), Rees-Jones (2017)).
Our theoretical results offer a plausible explanation for this difference: the relatively weak tax administration in
Ecuador makes it difficult to satisfy the conditions required for bunching caused by loss aversion and reference
dependence noted above.
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The analysis presented below has important implications for the broader literature on bunch-
ing of economic choices at policy thresholds. First, our analysis adds a caveat to the interpreta-
tion of the parameter estimated from observed bunching as an estimate of degree of loss aversion;
such an interpretation requires credible evidence in favor of linear preferences on both sides of
the threshold. The implications of kinked linear preference developed in this paper can be useful
in a variety of other contexts, and can be tested using panel data. Second, for a proper under-
standing of the observed choices, it is necessary to develop testable predictions from alternative
models based on reference dependence on either side of an economic relation (tax payers vs.
tax administration in our case). While the behavior of many firms is consistent with loss aver-
sion and reference dependence in taxpayer’s optimization, there is a substantial proportion of
firms that behaves more according to the audit trigger model, where the withholding threshold
is a reference point for audit, but the taxpayers follow the Allingham-Sandmo model. Thus
relying on a single model may not be appropriate for understanding the aggregate behavior.
Third, whether loss aversion leads to bunching in economic choices depends on the strength of
enforcement, implying heterogeneity across countries and contexts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature to
situate the concerns and contributions of the paper in context. Section 3 develops alternative
models of firm’s tax evasion with a focus on the implications of withholding. The next section
(section 4) is devoted to empirical strategy and lays out the testable implications of the theory for
bunching and unbunching of the firm’s tax payments at around the withholding threshold. We
discuss the institutional details about Tax Administration in Ecuador in section 5. In section 6,
we discuss the data and then present the empirical results showing that there is excess bunching
at the withholding threshold and it is not driven by lumps in firm characteristics. Section
7, arranged in a number of subsections, presents the results of tests of alternative models of
bunching. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings and implications for the broader
literature on bunching at policy thresholds.
2. Related Literature
This paper is related to two important strands of recent literature: (i) the role of third party
reporting and withholding, and (ii) implications of thresholds, kinks and notches in a tax system.
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As mentioned briefly in the introduction, the recent literature has underscored the importance
of third party reporting in both developed and developing countries. An important contribution
in this literature is the influential work by Saez, Kleven and Kreiner (2016) which shows that
third party enforcement (including withholding at the source) is the critical institutional feature
to understand the puzzle of high tax compliance in the face of low audit rates and punishments.
The effects of nonlinearities and discontinuities arising from government policies on economic
choices of citizens have been the focus of a substantial literature, especially in labor and public
economics. For example, Blundell and Hoynes (2004) analyze the effects of the requirement
of a minimum of 16 hours work for UK family credit, and find clear evidence of bunching
at exactly 16 hours of work. Closer to the subject of our analysis, there has been growing
interests in understanding the role played by thresholds, kinks, and notches in the tax system.
Slemrod (2016) and Kleven (2015) provide excellent reviews of this active area of research. In
an interesting paper, Saez (2010) shows that the taxpayers in USA bunch at the first kink of
the earned income tax credit (EITC) schedule, but there is no evidence of bunching at other
kinks of EITC. He finds that the compensated elasticity of reported income with respect to
the marginal tax rate is about zero for wage earners but substantially higher among those with
self-employment income. Saez (2010) constructs an expected utility model of evasion with fixed
costs of reporting and linear preferences which can explain these findings. Chetty et al. (2011)
provide evidence of substantial bunching at a large kink of the Danish income tax schedule, but
do not find any bunching at smaller kinks, consistent with Saez (2010). A related literature
focuses on the tax notches (for example, change in average tax rates at a threshold); see, for
example, the interesting analysis in the context of Pakistan by Kleven and Wasim (2013), and
in the context of Costa Rica by Bachas and Soto (2017). Kleven (2015) provides an excellent
treatment of the relative strengths of research designs that rely on kinks versus notches.
The implications of value added tax (VAT) exemption threshold have been analyzed in a
number of recent papers. Among theoretical contributions, Keen and Mintz (2004) show that
VAT thresholds create incentives for firms to bunch just below the threshold, and it distorts
the firm size distribution in an economy. Onji (2009) reports empirical evidence in the context
of VAT in Japan, by estimating the response of Japanese firms to a value-added tax threshold
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that accorded preferential tax treatment to smaller firms (less than 500 million yen in sales). He
finds evidence of firms bunching near the imposed threshold, suggesting that the large firms had
incentives to “masquerade” as many small firms by separately incorporating business segments
to avoid taxes.
Closer to the concerns of this paper, there is a small economic literature that analyzes possi-
ble interactions between withholding and evasion. Among the theoretical papers, Yaniv (1988)
constructs a model to analyze how withholding of wage income by an employer can lead to
evasion of the non-withheld taxes through non-filing of individual return, and Yaniv (1998) uses
a prospect theoretic model to explain the evidence that firms that expect to get a refund are
also more likely to submit a tax return. The empirical analysis of the effects of withholding has
been a relatively neglected area in the literature. Using data from Costa Rica, Brockmeyer and
Hernandez (2016) provide evidence that an increase in the withholding rate increases corporate
tax revenue. In an interesting and careful analysis of withholding of personal income tax in
Sweden, Engstrom et al. (2015) develop a regression kink and discontinuity design to provide
credible evidence that individual tax payers with a preliminary deficit (tax liability greater than
withheld amount) use deductions to escape from the loss domain. Using a prospect theoretic
model with reference dependence, loss aversion, and linear preference, they provide an estimate
of the loss aversion parameter. Linearity of preference seems a plausible assumption in their
context, as they focus on small line item deductions. Their analysis does not explore the impli-
cations of linear preference for persistence in bunching, and the pattern of unbunching over time.
In an important and insightful recent contribution, Rees-Jones (2018) presents a sophisticated
analysis of bunching of individual income tax payers in USA and provides credible evidence of
tax manipulations due to loss aversion. An interesting and important result in his analysis is
that even with linear preference it may not be possible to isolate the loss aversion parameter
from costs of manipulation. We provide complementary analysis by identifying other challenges
in estimating the loss aversion parameter from the observed bunching at policy thresholds.
3. Theory: Models of Firm’s Tax Choices in the Presence of Withholding
We begin with the standard Allingham-Sandmo model (henceforth A-S model) where with-
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holding does not affect a firm’s decisions because it does not affect the tax liability or the
enforcement. Then we introduce a simple extension that incorporates the idea that claiming
refund is costly. A second extension of the A-S model focuses on the possibility that claiming
refunds usually increases the probability of an audit, ceteris paribus, and develops a model where
the probability of audit jumps up discontinuously when a firm claims positive refund.9 These
three models are rooted in the expected utility theory of decision making under risk. The recent
literature in tax enforcement and compliance has highlighted that the A-S model based on ex-
pected utility theory has some implications that are firmly contradicted by the evidence, and the
prospect theory (Kahnemen and Tversky (1979)) provides a richer and more realistic framework.
A fourth model developed below incorporates three major elements of prospect theory: reference
dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity (implying utility function is concave in
the positive domain, but convex in the negative domain). In our context, the withheld amount
provides a natural reference point.
3.1. Withholding in the Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) Model
Assume that a firm’s tax liability is proportional to its profits. Let τ ∈ (0, 1) be the profit
tax rate. We define Πi = Yi−Ci where Πi is the profit of firm i, and Yi and Ci are sales and costs
respectively. So the true tax liability of firm i is Ti = τΠi. The firm reports profit pi
∗
i ≤ Πi and
its tax payments are ti = τpi
∗
i . When pi
∗
i < Πi, the firm underreports its tax liability and evades
taxes. When tax evasion is detected, the firm is forced to pay the evaded tax plus a penalty at a
rate θ. We now introduce withholding by a third party. The third party withholds a proportion
of the sales revenue of the firm and transmits it to the tax authority. Let the withholding rate
be δ, so the amount withheld is δYi. We define
Ψi =
ti
Yi
; Ψ˜i =
Ti
Yi
(1)
Thus Ψ˜i and Ψi are the true tax liability as a proportion of sales revenue and the actual tax
payments as a proportion of sales revenue respectively, and a firm’s true (no evasion) refund is
9While this is true in many developing countries, it is not necessarily true in developed countries such as
Sweden where the refund is automatic, the taxpayer does not need to make any claim for it. Thanks to Per
Engstrom for pointing this out. For a discussion on the refund process in Ecuador, please see section 5 below.
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positive if Ψ˜i < δ, and the claimed refund is positive if Ψi < δ .
Firm i chooses pii to maximize its expected after-tax profit:
max
pii
Wi = (1− P )Ui (Zgi ) + PUi
(
Zbi
)
(2)
where Zgi = Πi − τpii
Zbi = (Πi − τpii)− τ (1 + θ) (Πi − pii)
and P is the probability of audit, Zgi is the after tax profit when firm is not audited, Z
b
i is the
after tax profit when it is audited and has to pay penalty for tax evasion, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is the
penalty.10 We assume that an audit reveals tax evasion with certainty. The utility function
Ui is indexed by firm and captures possible risk heterogeneity among the firms. With a given
probability of detection, the first order condition for an interior solution implies the following:
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
U
′
i
(
Zbi
) = Pθ
(1− P ) (3)
Proposition 1
Consider the optimal decision of a firm i with profits Πi facing a tax enforcement regime
(P, θ > 0, δ > 0) . Denote the optimal reported profit to the tax authority by pi∗i . There exists
thresholds 1 > Pˆ ≥ P˜i > 0 such that:
(1.a) If P ≥ Pˆ , then pi∗i = Πi ; (4)
(1.b) If P < P˜i, then pi
∗
i = 0 ; (5)
(1.c) If P ∈
(
P˜i, Pˆ
)
, then

pi∗i = 0 if firm i is risk neutral
pi∗i ∈ (0, Πi) and
∂pi∗i
∂P
> 0 if firm i is risk averse (6)
10The restriction that the penalty rate is less than 100 percent is motivated by the fact that we are not aware
of any country where the fines for corporate tax evasion are as high as 100 percent. However, none of the results
that follow depends on this assumption.
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Proof:
Omitted. Please see the Online Appendix.
The important point in proposition (1) for our analysis is that a firm’s optimal choices do
not depend on the withholding rate δ, it only determines the amount of refund claimed once pi∗i is
chosen according to proposition 1. Also, the results in proposition (1) are useful for understanding
the effects of withholding in an audit trigger model (see section 3.3).
3.2. Transaction Costs in Claiming Refunds
A simple extension of the A-S model that allows for withholding to affect a firm’s decision
regarding tax payments can be due to transaction costs in claiming refunds, even though the
level of profit declared is not affected by the withholding. Consider the case when P ∈
(
P˜i, Pˆ
)
.
Assuming that there is no additional costs associated with claiming the refund, then proposition
(1) implies that a firm with Ψi < δ claims a refund even if it is small.
11 But if there are fixed
costs of compliance in claiming a refund, then some firms might choose not to claim a refund.
Let us denote the compliance costs of claiming the refund for firm i by κi > 0. Then the firm i
with Ψ˜i < δ will not claim any refund if the following holds:(
δ − τpi
∗
i
Yi
)
<
κi
Yi
⇒ κi > (δYi − τpi∗i ) (7)
One possibility for such a firm is to declare taxes at the withholding threshold, since it is not
going to claim the refund anyway. We may thus observe some bunching of firms’ declaring tax
liability at (or around) the withholding threshold. However, note that if a firm declares taxes
such that Ψi < δ , and then does not claim the refund because of the costs of compliance, we
should not observe the firms to bunch at the withholding threshold in the data where taxes are
the reported taxes, not the amount withheld.
3.3. An Audit Trigger Model
In this section, we formalize the idea that when a firm declares taxes less than the withheld
amount, the probability of audit increases. It may happen when the firms asks for positive refund,
and the tax authority (SRI) asks for additional documentation. However, the probability of audit
11This is a good description of countries such as Sweden where the refund is automatic.
10
may be higher for such a firm even if it does not request for the refund (see the discussion in the
context of Ecudaor in the next section). For simplicity, we assume that firms cannot hide the sales
revenue, and thus tax evasion occurs through over-reporting of costs. Denote the reported costs
by Cdi ∈ [Ci, Yi]. It is common that the tax authority uses the withholding rate as a focal point to
allocate its auditing resources (confirmed by interviews with tax officials in Ecuador). If a firm
declares a profit such that the implied (claimed) refund is positive, it triggers a discontinuously
higher probability of audit. We assume that the probability of detecting tax evasion depends on
the actual tax payments as a proportion of sales: P (Ψ) is a negative function of Ψi, but it declines
discontinuously when Ψi ≥ δ. Such an auditing scheme where the tax authority concentrates its
resources on the firms below a threshold might be optimal as shown in the theoretical literature
on optimal auditing (see Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986)).
The discontinuity in the P (Ψi) function can induce the firms to bunch at or around the
withholding threshold δ. To see this in a simple way, we consider a simple step function for
P (Ψi) :
P (Ψi) =
 P1 if Ψi < δP2 if Ψi ≥ δ
with P˜ < P2 < P1 < Pˆ
The assumption that P1 < Pˆ precludes the unrealistic case where the increase in probability
in audit when a firm makes a positive refund claim is so large that it makes all of the firms
declare taxes truthfully. We consider two types of firms separately depending on whether the
true tax liability Ψ˜i is lower or higher than the withholding threshold δ. Consider the firms
with true tax liability less than the withholding threshold (i.e., Ψ˜i < δ). When P1 < Pˆ , the risk
neutral firms declare pi∗i = 0 and risk averse firms declare pi
∗
i ∈ (0,Πi).12
For our analysis, more relevant is the subset of firms with Ψ˜i ≥ δ, the firms that face lower
probability of audit P2 if they declare tax liability truthfully, because their true refund is negative.
If the probability of audit remains the same at P2 across positive and negative refunds as is the
12Proposition 1 implies that they do not evade taxes and declare pi∗i = Πi if P1 > Pˆ .
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case in the standard A-S model, then some firms may find it optimal to report costs
(
Cdi
)
high
enough to make the refund positive. However, the discontinuous increase in the probability of
audit in the AT model when a firm claims a positive refund may make it optimal to bunch at
the withholding threshold. The set of firms that bunch at the withholding threshold and claim
zero refund is identified in proposition (2).
Proposition 2
Assume that P˜ < P2 < P1 < Pˆ and define µi ≡
[
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
U
′
i (Zbi )
]
piiτ=δYi
. Consider the firms with
true tax liability higher than the withholding threshold, (i.e., Ψ˜i > δ). There exist two thresholds
µ˘ > µ˜ such that the following results hold:
(2.a) The subset of firms that bunch at the withholding threshold belongs to the interval
µi ∈ (µ˜i, µ˘i) .
(2.b) The relatively more risk averse firms, i.e., µi < µ˜i, declare taxes higher than the with-
holding threshold, but less than their true tax liability, i.e., pi∗i ∈
(
δYi
τ
,Πi
)
.
Proof:
Omitted. Please see the online appendix.
Discussion
Note that µi is the ratio of marginal utility in good state (no audit) to that in bad state
(with audit) evaluated at the reported taxes exactly equal to the withheld amount. The lower
threshold µ˜i is determined by the following condition:
dWi
dCdi
∣∣∣∣∣∣pii=δYi
τ
≥ 0 =⇒ µi ≥ µ˜i ≡ P2θ
(1− P2)
Thus the lower threshold is such that firms with µi > µ˜i would prefer to declare taxes higher
than the withheld amount. The upper bound is determined as follows:
dWi
dCdi
∣∣∣∣∣∣pii=δYi
τ
≤ 0 =⇒ µi ≤ µ˘i ≡ P1θ
(1− P1)
Thus the firms with µi < µ˘i do not find it optimal to declare taxes more than the withheld
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amount when facing the higher audit regime P1. WithP1 < Pˆ , the firms in the middle of the
risk preference distribution bunch at the withholding threshold.
The magnitude of µi can be high due to two different factors: (i) low risk aversion, (ii) low
profit Πi. To see this transparently, consider the case where the utility function is of CRRA
form:
Ui (Zi) =
Z1−γii
1− γi
In this case, we have
µi =
[(
Zbi
Zgi
)γi]
piiτ=δYi
It follows that
∂µi
∂γi
= µiLn
(
Zbi
Zgi
)
≤ 0, because
(
Zbi
Zgi
)
∈ (0, 1] in general. It is straightforward
to check that
∂µi
∂Πi
< 0.
3.4. Withholding in A Prospect Theory Model: Do Reference Dependence and
Loss Aversion Lead to Bunching at the Withholding Threshold?
An immediate and obvious implications of withholding a proportion of sales revenue of a firm
is that it can act as a reference point when a firm is considering the cost-benefits of tax evasion.
The fact that withholding threshold can act as a reference point for tax payers has been noted in
the literature in the context of personal income tax evasion in Sweden and USA (see Engstrom
et al. (2015), Rees-Jones (2017)). We thus take the withheld amount (δYi) as the status quo
at the time of tax decisions by a firm, instead of the total profit of the firm as is the case in
the variants of Allingham-Sandmo models discussed above in sections (3.1) to (3.3). The utility
function (denoted by Vi) is assumed to be of the following form:
Vi (Xi) =
 Ui (Xi) if Xi ≥ 0−λUi (−Xi) if Xi < 0
where λ > 1 captures the strength of loss aversion, and Ui (Xi) is strictly concave so that
Vi (Xi) is concave in the gains domain, and convex in the losses domain. The payoffs in good
(no audit, denoted by superscript g) and bad (audit, denoted by superscript b) states are now
13
given as below:
Xgi (δ) = δYi − τpii ; Xbi (δ) = δYi − τpii − τ (1 + θ) (Πi − pii)
The enforcement regime is same as in the basic Allingham-Sandmo model in section (3.1)
above: the probability of audit is P > 0. We thus ignore the possibility that the firms may use
a nonlinear transformation of the probabilities to weight the payoffs in different states of the
world. This helps us to focus on the implications of reference dependence, loss aversion, and
diminishing sensitivity.
The firm chooses Cdi ∈ [Ci, Yi] to maximize the expected value of the prospect (suppressing
δ from Xi(δ) for notational simplicity):
MaxCdi EWi
(
Xbi , X
g
i | P, θ, δ
)
= (1− P )Vi (Xgi ) + PVi
(
Xbi
)
(8)
When the relevant Cdi is such that the payoffs are in the gain domain in both audit and
no-audit states, the optimal choices of the firm are exactly the same as the standard Allingham-
Sandmo model based on expected utility theory. The most interesting cases for our analysis of
possible bunching in tax payments are the ones where the payoff is positive in one state, but
negative in the other. The intuition is that the kink in the utility function at zero when pay-offs
span both the gain and loss domains may result in bunching in tax payments of firms. Thus
our focus is on the case where the utility function has a kink in relevant domain of Cdi . We
treat the cases where the true refund (i.e., when firm declares Cdi = Ci) is positive and negative
separately.
First, consider the firms that would claim positive refunds when declaring costs (and thus
taxes) truthfully, i.e., Ψ˜i < δ, and X
g
i (δ) = X
b
i (δ) > 0 when a firm declares C
d
i = Ci. This
implies that payoffs in both states of the world remain positive, if the extent of over-reporting is
small. An increase in reported costs Cdi increases X
g
i (payoff when not audited) and decreases
Xbi (payoff when audited), thus X
b
i turns negative if the reported cost is high enough. It is easy
to check, under certain restrictions on the magnitude of the penalty rate and the strength of loss
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aversion, only the risk-neutral firms may bunch at Xbi (δ) = 0. The bunching is driven by the
fact that the marginal cost of evasion function has a discontinuity at Xbi (δ) = 0. The important
point for our analysis, however, is that we should not observe any bunching in tax payments,
because the tax payments implied by Xbi (δ) = 0 are: τpii =
1
θ
[τ (1 + θ) (Yi − Ci)− δYi]. It is
easy to check that the tax declared by such a firm is always lower than the withheld amount.
We now turn to the central case for our analysis where the refund is negative if the firm
declares costs truthfully, i.e., Ψ˜i > δ. In this case, X
g
i (δ) = X
b
i (δ) < 0 if a firm declares
truthfully, i.e., Cdi = Ci. As C
d
i increases, X
b
i (δ) remains negative, while X
g
i (δ) moves towards
zero, eventually becoming positive with a kink at Xgi (δ) = 0. If optimally located at the kink,
the firm declares costs such that the tax payments exactly match the amount withheld. The
marginal return function is discontinuous in this case, but the marginal cost of evasion is not.
The expected marginal returns and costs are as follows (suppressing δ from Xi):
EMR =

−λ (1− P ) ∂Ui (−X
g
i )
∂Cdi
if Xgi < 0
(1− P ) ∂Ui (X
g
i )
∂Cdi
if Xgi ≥ 0
; EMC = −λP ∂Ui
(−Xbi )
∂Cdi
(9)
Thus for a firm to optimally declare costs at the kink point (i.e., Xgi (δ) = 0) resulting in
bunching of tax payments at around the withholding threshold, a firm’s marginal cost of evasion
has to fall inside the discontinuity in the marginal returns function noted above. To understand
better the conditions under which we can expect bunching of tax payments at the withholding
threshold, we consider two most widely used functional forms for Vi (.) in the literature; the S-
shaped power function that exhibits diminishing sensitivity and kinked linear preference. While
the S-shaped power function has been most widely used as the value function in prospect theory,
starting from the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), many recent works on bunching
at kinks and thresholds in tax systems assume linear preference (see, for example, Saez (2010),
Engstrom et al. (2015)).13
13The model developed by Saez (2010) is not based on loss aversion, where fixed costs of reporting plays a
critical role in an expected utility model of evasion.
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The power value function is given as below:
Ui (Xi) = X
βi
i (10)
with βi ∈ (0, 1) for a strictly concave function in the gains domain, and βi = 1 for linear
preference. As noted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), preference homogeneity requires that
the value function takes the power function form as in equation (10) above, and al-Nowaihi et al.
(2008) show that loss aversion rules out different values for the exponent of the power function
in the gains and losses domains (for a discussion, see Dhami (2016)).14 So the S-shaped Vi (.)
function takes the following form:
Vi (Xi) =
 X
βi
i if Xi ≥ 0
−λ (−Xi)βi if Xi < 0
The corresponding condition required for bunching of tax payments at the withholding threshold
δ is:
θP
1− P <
(∣∣Xbi (δ)∣∣
|Xgi (δ)|
)1−βi
<
λθP
1− P (11)
It immediately follows that the second part of inequality condition (11) cannot be satisfied
at Xgi (δ) = 0 if βi ∈ [0, 1). Given a value of βi ∈ [0, 1), the second part of inequality (11)
is satisfied only if |Xgi (δ)| is larger than a strictly positive threshold, thus ruling out not only
exact bunching at the threshold, but also precluding bunching in a neighborhood [ϵ−, ϵ+] of the
threshold. This is intuitive as the power value function satisfies the Inada conditions.
The impossibility of bunching in the standard prospect theoretic model is due to a combina-
tion of two properties of the value function: homotheticity, and diminishing sensitivity (βi < 1).
One can generate bunching in this model by relaxing either of these assumptions, but the impor-
tant question is whether the resulting value function is empirically grounded and theoretically
consistent.
To see that a nonhomothetic value function can generate bunching, consider the simple case
14Preference homogeneity implies that when all prizes in a lottery are scaled up by a factor φ then the certainty
equivalent of the lottery is also scaled up by φ.
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where the value function is given as below (instead of equation (10) above):15
U˜i (Xi) = (∆i +Xi)
βi (12)
The inequality condition for bunching at the withholding threshold in (11) above now be-
comes:
θP
1− P <
(∣∣∆i +Xbi (δ)∣∣
|∆i +Xgi (δ)|
)1−βi
<
λθP
1− P (13)
It is clear that inequality (13) can be satisfied with Xgi (δ) = 0 as long as ∆i ̸= 0, implying
that bunching at the withholding threshold for a subset of the firms is possible. However, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to find a plausible interpretation of the nonhomothetic term ∆i,
and we are not aware of any empirical foundation for such a value function in the behavioral
economics literature.16 When ∆i < 0, this specification effectively assumes that there is a second
reference point in addition to the withholding threshold. This defeats the whole idea that the
withholding threshold is the relevant reference point for a firm’s tax decisions. We thus do not
pursue this as a reasonable extension.
In contrast, there is a substantial literature in behavioral economics that provides theoretical
and empirical justifications in favor of a linear (homothetic) value function (see, for example,
Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Thaler et al. (1997), Nielson (2002), Dhami (2016)). As noted by
Arrow (1971), linearity of preference (equivalent to risk neutrality in expected utility theory)
may be a reasonable approximation for small stakes, and Rabin (2000) argues that it is also
plausible for medium stakes. In the context of prospect theory, a kinked linear specification of
Vi (.) function has some additional desirable properties; it satisfies weak and strong loss aversion
as defined by Nielson (2002), while the power value function does not. In the model above, when
βi = 1 (i.e., linear preference), it is possible for firms to optimally declare C
d
i > Ci such that
Xgi (δ) = 0. Given an enforcement regime (P, θ), bunching requires the following conditions:
Pθ < (1− P ) and λ > 1− P
θP
. An immediate implication is that with weak tax administration
15We thank Per Engstrom for raising this issue.
16For an axiomatic foundation for the homothetic power value function, see al-Nowaihi et al. (2008). Thanks
to Sanjit Dhami for clarifications on this point.
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(low P and θ), it is easier to satisfy the first inequality, but it is also more likely to violate
the second inequality given a degree of loss aversion λ. Thus in developing countries where tax
enforcement capacity is low, it is less likely to observe bunching of taxpayers at the withholding
threshold due to loss aversion and reference dependence. On the other hand, if P and θ are very
high, then it is unlikely that the first inequality will be satisfied, which implies that bunching due
to loss aversion is also less likely when enforcement regime is very strong. However, the recent
evidence that individual taxpayers in Sweden and USA bunch in withholding threshold due to
loss aversion presented by Engstrom et al. (2015) and Rees-Jones (2018) suggests that the first
inequality is not violated in these cases. This is consistent with the widely held view that the
enforcement regime in developed countries is not strong enough to account for the observed tax
compliance in a an Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion (Saez et al. (2016)).
The result that with linear preference firms may bunch their tax payments at the withholding
threshold due to loss aversion is consistent with Engstrom at al. (2015) where the focus is on
individual taxpayers, but we establish it in a more general model with an enforcement regime.
The result that with S-shaped power utility function exhibiting diminishing sensitivity, firms
cannot bunch at the withholding threshold has not been noted in the literature, to our knowl-
edge. Perhaps more important, as we discuss below, the assumption of kinked linear preference
generates a set of testable predictions (please see section (4) below), which are not considered
in the current literature, to our knowledge.
Proposition 3
(3.a) Assume that the firms have S-shaped power utility function Vi (.) that exhibits loss
aversion, diminishing sensitivity (concave in the gains domain, and convex in the losses domain,
i.e., βi ∈ [0, 1)),) and reference dependence with the withheld amount as the reference point.
Then the tax payments of the firms do not bunch at the withholding threshold irrespective of
whether a firm expects a positive
(
Ψ˜i < δ
)
or negative
(
Ψ˜i > δ
)
refund when declaring taxes
truthfully.
(3.b) Assume that the utility function is linear in both gains and losses domains, i.e., βi = 1.
Consider the firms that expect a negative refund when declaring taxes truthfully, i.e., with Ψ˜i > δ.
Then the tax payments of firms bunch at the withholding threshold if the loss aversion is high
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enough so that λ >
1− P
θP
, and the penalty for evasion is low enough so that θ <
1− P
P
.
(3.c) The tax payments of the firms with βi = 1 and Ψ˜i < δ do not bunch, and they declare
tax payments to the left of the withholding threshold.
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identification Problem: Behavioral Response to the Threshold or Lump in
the Firm Distribution?
The analysis above shows that bunching around the withholding threshold can arise from
optimizing choices of firms trying to evade taxes facing a withholding and enforcement regime.
There is, however, another possibility that can give rise to bunching of firms around the thresh-
old which has little to do with a firm’s optimizing behavior. The observed bunching could simply
reflect a mass in the true distribution of firm’s profit/sales ratio determined by factors such as
preference and technology. While firms’ profit/sales ratios are determined by many charac-
teristics including entrepreneurial ability, we can illustrate the possibility by using the simple
model above where firm’s differ in terms of risk preference only. Consider the AT model where
bunching is due to evasion facing a change in the audit rate across the withholding threshold.
According to the audit trigger model, the mass of bunched firms is given by
B (δ;P1,P2, θ) =
ˆ µ˘
µ˜
dF (µi)
where F (µi) is the CDF of the firms with true tax liability higher than the withholding threshold.
One can observe a lump in the distribution of firms’ profit tax payments around δ in the absence
of any bunching induced by withholding if the following conditions hold: (i) there is a lump in
the risk heterogeneity below µ˘, (ii) firms with similar risk preference also have similar profits
and sales revenue.
While the withholding rate may coincide with such a lump in the distribution by pure chance,
it can also be outcome of choices by the tax administration. If the tax administration has a
good estimate of the true distribution of profits and sales, they may set the “right” withholding
rate–one that facilitates tax payer’s compliance. In these cases, the observed bunching around
the withholding rate may not indicate any behavioral response by the firms to the threshold.
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This is the central identification problem for our empirical analysis: how do we know that the
observed bunching is not due to a lump in the firm distribution due to lumps in the distribution
of risk preference and technology, but is an outcome of firm’s optimal choices as illustrated in
the models above? It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reject this alternative hypothesis
in a cross-section survey, or in panel data where the withholding rate does not vary across firms
and over time. An important advantage of our study is that we can exploit quasi experimental
variations in the withholding rate across sectors and over time to provide credible evidence on
the relevance of optimizing choices of firms in the observed bunching. To solve the identification
problem we exploit a simple insight: if the bunching is due to technological or other factors
unrelated to withholding, firms will stay bunched at the same threshold when the withholding
rate is changed by a policy reform.
Testable Prediction 1
(TP 1) If the bunching observed at around the withholding threshold is due to factors unrelated
to withholding such as technology, then when the withholding rate changes, the bunching should
remain largely undisturbed. If the alternative hypothesis that bunching is due to optimizing
choices by the firms facing the withholding threshold, then the bunching in tax payments at
around the initial threshold would not be observed after the change in the withholding threshold,
the distribution would become smooth.
4.2 Empirical Strategy to Discriminate Among Alternative Models
4.2.1. Testing the Null Hypothesis of Bunching Due to Transaction costs
We develop a test of the null hypothesis that bunching is due to transaction costs by exploiting
a quasi-experimental policy reform in Ecuador in June 2007 that increased the withholding rate
from 1 percent to 2 percent in some of the industries. The policy reform can be modeled as an
increase in the withholding rate from δ to 2δ. We focus on the implications of the increase in the
withholding rate on the tax payments of the firms in 2007 that bunched at the δ-threshold in the
earlier years. We emphasize here that the new withholding rate was imposed in the middle of
the year, so we should not expect any bunching of tax payments at the new threshold in 2007.17
17A related point is that bunching at the new threshold for evasion is likely to take time as the relevant firms
adjust their accounting to the new threshold.
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When the threshold is δ, the set of firms that bunch because of transaction costs is given by
{i} ∋ Ψ˜i < δ and κi > (δYi − τpi∗i ). Thus the firms that bunch at the threshold are those with
relatively less (true) tax liability and high transactions costs. Facing the higher withholding
rate 2δ, many of these firms may find it worthwhile to claim the refund, as the change in the
withholding rate should not affect the transaction costs. The set of firms that bunched at the
δ threshold in 2006, but declare lower taxes after the reform and claim a positive refund is
given by the following conditions: {i} ∋ Ψ˜i < δ and (2δYi − τpi∗i )2007 > κi > (δYi − τpi∗i )2006.
This implies that if bunching is driven by transactions costs, we should observe a decline in
the tax declarations in 2007 of many of the firms that bunched at around the δ-threshold in
2006. Note that the 100 percent increase in the withholding rate makes this test credible, the
effects of the policy change on the withheld amount can be canceled out only in the implausible
case where the sales of a firm falls by 50 percent from 2006 to 2007. Note that even if a firm
does not declare lower tax liability when the withholding rate is doubled, they would never
declare higher taxes if transaction costs are the driving force behind the observed bunching. In
the empirical implementation, we use a difference-in-difference design with firm fixed effects to
take into account the changes in profit from 2006 to 2007. Since our analysis focuses on the
profit/sales ratio, the changes in sales volume due to demand shifts cannot be responsible for
the results.
The implications of an increase in the withholding rate in the LPT and AT models are
different: they do not preclude the possibility that some of the firms will declare higher taxes
in 2007 following the reform. First consider the AT model: the policy reform affects the tax
payments of the firms with Ψ˜i ∈ (δ, 2δ) in an audit trigger model, because the audit probability
faced by them increases from P2 to P1 even if they declare the tax liability truthfully.
18 Note
that these firms will not bunch at the new threshold because only firms with Ψ˜i > 2δ can bunch
at the new withholding threshold. Many of the firms that evaded taxes and bunched at the
δ-threshold in 2006 will declare higher taxes facing the higher probability of audit P1 in 2007
because for any risk averse firm i , we have
∂pi∗i
∂P
> 0 according to proposition (1.c) above.
18For all other firms, the audit probability remains the same as before if they declare their tax liability truthfully,
but the threshold where the audit probability changes is different at 2δY .
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In the LPT model, an increase in the withholding rate affects the firms with true tax liability
in the interval Ψ˜i ∈ (δ, 2δ) because they get a positive refund after the increase in the withholding
rate when reporting costs truthfully, but owed taxes in the initial withholding regime (δ-regime).
With linear preference firms can bunch because of loss aversion only if they get negative refund
when reporting truthfully, the firms that bunched at the δ-threshold to evade taxes previously
will not bunch at the new withholding threshold 2δ, but some of them may bunch at Xbi (2δ) = 0.
As noted before, this implies that the tax payments do not bunch at the withholding threshold
δ or 2δ. However, whether a firm declares higher tax liability depends on the profitability of a
firm. It is easy to check that with the higher withholding rate, the tax payments implied by
Xbi (2δ) = 0 are higher than tax payments of the firms bunched at δ (i.e.,δYi) when the following
condition holds:
[
Yi − Ci
Yi
]
>
(
δ
τ
)(
1 + θ
2 + θ
)
. So after the increase in the withholding rate, some
of the firms with higher profit that initially bunched at the δ-threshold and paid taxes equal
to δYi will declare higher tax payments, while others may declare lower tax payments after the
withholding rate increases to 2δ. The response of tax payments by the firms that bunch at the
δ-threshold before 2007 thus cannot discriminate between the AT and LPT models for which we
develop different tests in the following section.
Testable Prediction 2
(TP 2) If the bunching at the δ-threshold is driven by transaction costs in claiming refunds,
some of the initially-bunched firms would reduce their tax payments, and no firm would increase
its tax payments, following an increase in the withholding rate, ceteris paribus. In contrast, if
the bunching is driven by the discontinuity in the audit regime or loss aversion in a LPT model,
the tax payments by some of the initially-bunched firms would increase after an increase in the
withholding rate.
4.2.2. Bunching and Tax Evasion: Kinked Linear Preference or Discontinuity in
the Audit Regime?
The theoretical results in propositions (2) and (3) in section 3 suggest a simple strategy to
discriminate between the LPT and AT models: use indicators of risk heterogeneity across firms,
and test the null hypothesis implied by LPT that the probability of bunching is the highest for
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the firms most likely to be risk-neutral (linear preference). There is a substantial theoretical
and empirical literature that suggests that the large firms are less risk averse, because they
can diversify the risk, and also because less risk-averse managers/owners are more likely to
self-select into large firms (Arrow (1993), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), Engel, Fischer, and
Galetovic (1998), Herranz et al. (2015), Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014)). The more risk averse
firms rely on self-financing for investment, and consequently accumulate less assets, and do not
grow large.19 Thus firm size measured by assets can be used as a plausible indicator of risk
heterogeneity among firms; the larger a firm is, the more likely it is to be risk-neutral. In
contrast, if the AT model is appropriate where bunching is driven by a discontinuity in the audit
regime around the threshold, the relation between the firm-size and probability of bunching is
inverted U-shaped, because only the firms in the middle of the asset size distribution are likely
to bunch as they are most likely to satisfy the condition that µi ∈ (µ˜, µ˘).
The above tests of the AT and LPT models based on firm size are valid if loss aversion
does not vary significantly across firm size. The available evidence supports this assumption
(see Kapoor (2017)).20 One can argue that the large firms are also likely to be less loss-averse,
and thus not likely to bunch according to the LPT model. However, this also implies that the
medium (and small) firms will also not bunch because they are likely to be not only more loss
averse, but also more risk averse (βi < 1).
A second and more definite test of LPT relies on the observation that βi = 1 implies that
the expected marginal returns to and marginal costs of evasion do not depend on the profit of
a firm; implying that changes in a firm’s revenue and costs cannot change a firm’s bunching
status as long as P , θ, and δ are unchanged. This has important implications for persistence in
bunching over time. If a firm bunches at the withholding threshold in year t, it will bunch in all
other years when P , θ, and δ remain the same, because the changes in revenue and costs over
the years do not affect the bunching decision so long as true tax liability remains higher than the
19The available evidence shows that the small firms use less debt and buy less insurance (Herranz et al. (2015),
Collier et al. (2016)). For evidence that large firms are more able to withstand negative shocks by using their
better access to credit market, see Khwaja and Mian (2008). As noted by Arrow (1993), large firms may also
have more stable internal capital supply.
20Using experimental evidence from restaurant industry, Kapoor (2017) shows that the effects of risk preference
on loss aversion is not statistically significantly different from zero. See Table 3 in Kapoor (2017).
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withheld amount, i.e., Ψ˜i > δ. When the firms experience shocks to revenue and costs in a way
to make its true tax refunds switch from negative to positive, then they will unbunch from the
withholding threshold, but bunch at the threshold where Xbi (δ) = 0 according to proposition
(3) above. As shown in proposition (3.c) above, such firms always declare taxes lower than the
withheld amount.
In contrast, the audit trigger model shows that firms in the middle of the µ distribution
bunch, i.e., firm i bunches if µi ∈ (µ˜, µ˘), assuming that P1 < Pˆ which is a plausible assumption
in most, if not all, countries, as noted earlier. Since
∂µi
∂Ci
> 0, and
∂µi
∂Yi
< 0, it follows that if
there are significant changes in revenue and/or costs, a firm can bunch in one year, but not in
another even though its true tax liability is higher than the withheld amount in all years, and
the enforcement and withholding regime has not changed. We summarize the above discussion
in the following testable predictions.
Testable Predictions 3
Assume that P , θ, and δ remain unchanged over the relevant years under consideration.
(TP 3.1) Since the large firms are more likely to be risk neutral (linear preference), the
propensity to bunch will be highest for the firms that belong to the right tail of firm size distribution
under the LPT model. Under the alternative hypothesis of AT model, the firms that fall in the
middle of the farm size distribution will be most likely to bunch, making the relation between
farm size and probability of bunching inverted U-shaped.
(TP 3.2) Under the null hypothesis that bunching is generated by linear preference with a kink
due to loss aversion (LPT model), a firm that bunches at the withholding threshold at period t,
will also bunch at other periods irrespective of the changes in its sales revenue and costs over the
years as long as Ψ˜it > δ ,∀t. If the revenue and costs of a firm that bunched at the withholding
threshold in year t change in year t+ 1 in a way so that it switches from Ψ˜it > δ to Ψ˜i(t+1) < δ,
then the firm unbunches and declares tax liability smaller than the withheld amount in year t+1.
(TP 3.3) Under the alternative hypothesis that bunching at the withholding threshold is due
to the audit trigger model (AT model), some firms that bunch at period t, may not bunch at
the withholding threshold in other years, even though Ψ˜i > δ in all of the years. Under the AT
model, some of the firms that unbunch may declare taxes higher than the withheld amount.
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5. Tax Administration and Withholding System in Ecuador
In this section, we provide some details about the tax administration in Ecuador (SRI) and
the withholding mechanism. Ecuadorian firms are taxed on their profits using a flat tax rate of
25%.21 Firms are required to file year t tax returns between February and April of year t + 1.
The withholding system is a mechanism where companies designated by the SRI as withholding
agents are required to deduct and withhold a fixed percentage of the payments they make to
other firms. This fixed percentage is known as the withholding rate. Every month, withholding
agents must report and transfer all withholdings to the tax authority. Firms can deduct their
withheld funds, including those from previous years (up to five years), from their current tax
liability. Sales to final consumers are not subject to withholding.
When the withheld amount exceeds the firm’s tax liabilities, the SRI does not automatically
grant a refund. The SRI keeps the difference between the withheld funds and the firm’s tax
liability unless a petition for a refund is filed. However, if the withheld amount exceed tax
obligations, an Ecuadorian firm can request a tax refund due to over payment and/or request
that the positive outstanding balance be used as a credit for the future (the credit has to be used
within three years after the request is approved). These requests have to be approved by the
tax administration and strictly adhere to procedures described in the Ecuadorian Tax Code’s
(Article 119).
Firms applying for a refund must submit a refund application as well as updated credentials
of their legal representative, bank statements, invoices, and other documents that support the
claim. Once a request is submitted, the SRI verifies the validity of the request and its docu-
mentation. During this process cross-checks are performed using third party data. If the tax
administration detects irregularities, it can trigger an audit or, in more serious cases, suspend
the refund process and start a “complementary procedure” aimed at reassessing the firm’s tax
liability (Ecuadorian Tax Code Article 131). This action can result in penalties according to the
severity of the infringement. Thus requesting a tax refund increases significantly the intensity
at which a firm is monitored by the SRI.
21This tax rate was unchanged until 2010. The common and unchanged tax rate helps us identify the effects
of withholding threshold.
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SRI uses data from many sources to compute a tax-evasion-risk index for every tax payer
(firms and individuals) in Ecuador which is used to prioritize auditing efforts. Specific details
about the construction of these indexes are confidential. It should be noted, however, that
in addition to discrepancies between third-party and self-reported entries in the tax return,
deadline noncompliance, any differences between the withheld amount and tax liability affect
the index. In particular, when a firm’s withheld taxes exceed the tax obligations, audit risk can
automatically increase even if the firm does not request a refund.
The 1988 Tax Law set a maximum of 10 percent upper bound on the withholding rates.
In 1989, a Ministerial Decree set the 1% withholding rate which for most goods and services
remained unchanged until 2007. Withholding rates can be unilaterally changed by the tax
authority without any approval of the legislative or executive power (assuming a rate not higher
than the maximum of 10 percent). These rates in a given period vary according to the goods or
services being purchased, and also have changed over time. Table 1 shows how withholding rates
for the four categories of products we study have changed since 2003. In July 1, 2007, withholding
rates for sales of retail goods and other services (including construction) increased from 1 to 2
percent. This was an important change that affected a large share of commercial transactions.
But the withholding rate for sales of transportation services remained constant at 1 percent over
this period; it was not affected by changes in withholding rates in 2007. While there are no
official reports explaining why this was the case, transport sector is a highly organized group
with unions operating at regional and national levels. It is likely that the government exchanged
this exemption for political support. The important point for us is that the exemption was
determined by political calculus, and thus does not reflect any systematic bias with respect to
the tax liability of a firm.
The withholding rates listed on Table 1 apply to products rather than to firms. For example,
a firm that sells both manufacturing goods and transportation services could be subject to
different withholding rates after the policy change in July 1, 2007. However, such cases of a
single firm spanning multiple withholding rates are highly unlikely. While there is no one to
one correspondence between the firm’s ISIC economic activity and the products it sells, it is
reasonable to assume that a) all firms in the manufacturing and the retail sector are subject to
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the withholding rates that apply to tangible goods purchases, b) all firms in the construction
sector are subject to the withholding rates that apply to real estate construction activities, and
c) all firms in the transportation sector are subject to the withholding rates that apply to private
passenger transport and public and private freight services.
6. Does Withholding Lead to Bunching Due to Firm’s Optimization?
In this section, we test if Ecuadorian firms’ tax/sales ratio (ie., Ψi) concentrates around the
withholding rate (δ = 0.01) before 2007 reform. We start by describing the data, and then show
graphical and econometric evidence that firms do bunch around the withholding threshold and
that the bunching is due to firm’s optimizing choices facing the withholding and enforcement
regime.
6.1. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on administrative data from the Ecuadorian Tax Authority
(SRI). We obtained the universe of corporate profit tax returns from for years 2004, 2005, 2006
and 2007. These returns are reported on form F101 and are submitted once a year. The fiscal
year coincides with the calendar year, and returns are due in April of the following year.
We focus on the firms in the following four economic activities: construction, manufacturing,
wholesale trade and retail, and transportation. This allows us to exploit the variation in the
withholding rates both across industries and over time described in the previous section. After
eliminating duplicates and observations with missing data, we are left with an unbalanced panel
of about 12,000 firms per year.22 We thus have three years of panel data from 2004 to 2006
during which the withholding and enforcement regime did not change. These three-year panel
data allow us to implement the testable predictions (3) which help discriminate between the
LPT and AT models. The policy reform in 2007 that increased the withholding rate from 1
percent of sales to 2 percent helps us discriminate between the transaction costs model against
the LPT and AT models.
Details about the variables and descriptive statistics for the years 2006 and 2007 are provided
in Table 2. Ecuadorian firms’ assets in these industries averaged $1.7 and $1.9 million in 2006
22We focus on firms that report positive sales.
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and 2007, respectively. Their mean annual revenue (sales) increased from $2.9 million in 2006
to $3.3 million in 2007. Average profit tax liability also increased from $28,000 to $35,000.
6.2. Bunching of Tax Payments at the Withholding Threshold : Graphical and
Econometric Evidence
We first provide some graphical evidence on bunching by estimating the distribution of the
firm’s tax/sales ratio (Ψi) in each of the four industries in our data set. However, even if all
firms in our sample report a tax liability that is exactly equal to their withheld funds, we do not
expect to see a degenerate distribution of the tax/sales ratio for two reasons. First, the sales
made to final consumers are not subject to withholding, and some firms in our sample sell some
of their products to consumers. Second, the firms can use the withheld funds from previous
periods (up to five years) to pay current year tax liabilities. For these reasons, even if all firms in
our data declare taxes that are identical to their withheld funds, the distribution of the reported
tax/sales ratio should be concentrated around the withholding requirement.
Figures 1 to 4 show histograms of the tax/sales ratio by year for firms in the construction,
manufacturing, retail and transport sectors, respectively. Between 2004 and 2006, there is a
noticeable clustering of firms around the 0.01 bin in all of the industries, which coincides with
the withholding requirement of 1%.
To formally test for bunching patterns in the data we follow the approach suggested by Saez
(2010). That is, we say that a firm “bunches” if its reported tax/sales ratio lies within a small
distance (ρ) from the withholding rate. For robustness, we choose three alternative values for
ρ (0.08%, 0.09% and 0.10%). The variable Bai equals one if firm i’s tax/sales ratio in 2006 is
between 0.0092 and 0.0108. Similarly, the variables Bbi and Bci equal one if the 2006 tax/sales
ratio falls within the intervals [0.0091, 0.0109] and [0.0090, 0.0110], respectively. Using these
definitions, we find that about 6%, 8% and 10% of firms in our sample “bunch” around the
withholding rate, respectively.
For each of the three bands defined above, two symmetric surrounding intervals are computed:
[1%-2ρ, 1%-ρ] and [1%+ρ, 1%+2ρ]. To estimate if there is excess bunching, we simply estimate
the difference between the fraction of firms in the interval around the withholding rate and the
fraction of firms in the two surrounding bands. Let H∗ be the share of firms in the bunching
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interval around the withholding rate and H+ and H− be the share of firms in the upper and
lower surrounding bands, respectively. As in Saez (2010), the share of firms in each of the three
bands is estimated by simultaneously regressing a dummy variable for belonging to each interval
on a constant in the sample of firms belonging to any of these intervals. Excess bunching is
defined as E = H∗ − (H− +H+). For each of the three interval definitions, we estimate E and
test if it is statistically different from zero.
The first panel of Table 3 reports the test’s p-values for each industry using the 2004-2006
pooled sample. Notice that for all values of ρ we can reject the null of no-bunching at virtually
any standard significance levels. The statistical tests confirm the existence of excess mass of
firms reporting a tax/sales ratio close to 1%. Tests are also performed using the 2006 sample
only. Results shown on the second panel of Table 3 confirm that during 2006 firms in the four
industries we consider bunch near the withholding rate.23
6.3. Evidence on the Effects of the Change in the Withholding Rate in 2007
We construct histograms of tax/sales ratio for the year 2007 when withholding requirements
of some industries increased from 1% to 2%. A comparison of the 2007 histograms with the
corresponding histograms for 2004, 2005, 2006 in figures 1-4 reveals interesting patterns. The
most striking is the fact that the spike at the 0.01 tax/sales ratio bin observed in 2004-2006
completely disappears in 2007 in those industries where withholding rates were modified (con-
struction, manufacturing and trade).24 Moreover, the spike in the density of the tax/sales ratio
for firms in the transportation sector seems to remain constant at 0.01 (the unchanged withhold-
ing rate). We also formally test if the 2007 tax/sales ratio densities display excessive bunching
at 1%. Results displayed in the third panel of Table 3 suggest that there is no evidence of
bunching except for the transport industry where the withholding rate did not change. These
results contradict the interpretation that the bunching in 2004- 2006 at around the withholding
threshold is due to underlying heterogeneity in firm characteristics, and are consistent with the
23We also use an alternative method due to Kleven et al. (2015) to compute excess bunching around the
withholding threshold and obtained similar results. The details are available from the authors.
24Note that the change in withholding rates occurred in the middle of the year (June 2007) and affected only
the second half of the year sales. Thus, one cannot expect to see bunching patterns around the new withholding
rate of 2%.
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predictions from our theoretical model.
7. Evidence on Alternative Models of Bunching
7.1. Is Bunching at the Withholding Threshold Due to Transactions Costs?
To test if the bunching observed in the years before the change in withholding rate in 2007
is consistent with the transaction costs model, we test the prediction that the firms that bunch
at the withholding threshold in 2006 are likely to reduce their tax payments in 2007, and none
of them can increase their tax payments. To ensure that the estimated effects of the change
in withholding rate is not driven by changes in profitability from 2006 to 2007, we implement
a difference-in-difference-in difference (or triple difference) strategy with firm fixed effect where
the dependent variable is the difference between the 2007 reported profit tax to sales ratio and
the 2006 counterpart. The independent variable of interest B is a binary indicator that takes
the value of 1 if a firm’s tax payments bunched at around the withholding threshold in 2006,
i.e., the tax/sales ratio was close to δ = 0.01. The Results of this test are shown in Table 4.
The first column reports the estimates for the firms in industries that experienced an increase
in the withholding rate (manufacturing, construction and retail) in 2007 while the sample used
for the second column consists of the firms that experienced no change in withholding rates
(transport sector). The estimates in each column provides the difference-in-difference (DID)
estimates using the firms that do not bunch as the comparison. When we subtract the DID
estimate in the second column (assuming the estimate is statistically significant) from that in
the firms column, we get the triple-difference (DIDID) estimate of the effects of the change in the
withholding rate on the tax declarations of the firms that bunched in 2006. When the estimates
in the second column are not statistically different from zero, then the triple difference estimates
are the same as the DID estimates.
The results provide evidence that the set of firms that bunched at around the threshold in
2006 shows a significantly larger increase in reported profit rates in 2007 only when withholding
rates increased from 1 percent to 2 percent. For example, the coefficient of interest in the first
row and first column (0.001) suggests that firms that bunched in 2006 in the manufacturing
retail and construction sectors increased their reported profit-rates by 0.001 more, (about 10%
more than the average profit rate at baseline) than their counterparts that did not bunch. The
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estimate is statistically significant at the 1% significance level and economically important. On
the other hand, when we analyze an industry that experienced no changes in δ in 2007, we find
no differences: the coefficients of interest in the second column of Table 4 is a precisely estimated
zero. Thus the triple difference estimate is in fact equal to the DID estimate reported in column
1. The estimates for other definitions of bunching in rows 2 and 3 are similar. They show that
the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent only for those firms that experienced
an increase in the withholding rate. The estimates for the firms that did not face a higher
withholding rate in 2007 are statistically not different from zero. The evidence that the DID
estimates for the firms in the placebo industry (without the policy change) are not statistically
significant thus provides support the the validity of the DID estimates.
The evidence in Table 4 thus rejects the null hypothesis that the mechanism behind the
observed bunching of tax payments in 2006 is transaction costs in claiming refunds. However,
as noted earlier, the evidence that the firms that bunched in 2006 increase their tax declaration
in 2007 is consistent with both the LPT and AT models.
7.2. Linear Prospect Theory (LPT) vs. Audit Trigger Model (AT)
In this section we discuss evidence on the testable predictions (TP.3) that help us discriminate
between the LPT and AT models.
The Relationship Between a Firm Size and Probability of Bunching
According to the testable prediction TP.3, only the risk-neutral (linear preference) firms
bunch under the null hypothesis that LPT is the correct model of tax evasion by the firms.
Moreover, the relation between risk averseness and the probability of bunching is inverted-U
shaped under the AT model. We use the rank of a firm in the distribution of asset-size as an
indicator of risk preference and risk bearing capacity of a firm with the firms at the right tail
expected to behave as approximately risk-neutral.
Table 5A reports estimates of the partial correlation between indicators of of large farm
size and the probability of bunching for three different definitions of bunching. We use four
different definitions of “large firm”, corresponding to firms that belong to more than 75th, 90th,
95th, and 99th percentile of asset size distribution. The estimates are consistently negative and
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statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The evidence thus shows that the large firms are
less likely to bunch which can be interpreted as suggestive evidence against the prediction from
the LPT model that only the risk-neutral firms bunch at the withholding threshold.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of firms that bunch by asset decile; the relation seems inverted-
U for all three definitions of bunching. Table 5B reports the results from formal test of the null
hypothesis that the relation between the probability of bunching and firm size is inverted U. The
standard approach to testing a U or inverted-U relation is to include a quadratic term and check
the sign and significance of the coefficient on the quadratic term. However, as noted by Lind and
Mehlum (2010), such a test cannot discriminate between a true inverted-U and a monotonically
increasing concave function. So in addition to estimates from a quadratic specification, we
implement the Sasabuchi t-test and use the Fieller method to estimate the implied extremum
point and its 95% confidence interval as developed in Lind and Mehlum (2010). Consider the
following quadratic regression specification:
Bit (δ = 0.01) = θ0 + θ1Fi(t−1) + θ2F 2i(t−1) + ϵi (14)
where Bit (δ = 0.01) is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when the firm i bunches
at the 1 percent withholding threshold and Fi(t−1) is the measure of firm size in terms of asset
rank in period (t-1). The existence of an inverted-U can be tested on an interval
[
F li , F
h
i
]
with
the following combined null hypotheses against the combined alternatives:
H0 : θ1 + 2θ2F
l
i(t−1) ≤ 0; θ1 + 2θ2F hi(t−1) ≥ 0
HA : θ1 + 2θ2F
l
i(t−1) > 0; θ1 + 2θ2F
h
i(t−1) < 0
(15)
The estimates from the regression equation (12) above with t=2006 and t − 1=2005 are
reported in the top panel of Table 5B. The coefficient on the quadratic terms is negative and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on the level term is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The evidence thus is consistent with a
monotonically increasing concave relation or an inverted-U.
The lower panel of Table 5B reports the results of the test of the null hypothesis that the
32
relation is either convex or monotonically increasing concave function against the sharp alter-
native that the relation is inverted-U. The test of inverted-U in inequalities (13) is implemented
using Sasabuchi (1980) t test, and the results are in row 5 of Table 5B. In addition, we estimate
the implied extremum point and its 95% confidence interval using the Fieller method. The
estimates reject the joint null that the relation is either monotone or U-shaped. The evidence
thus provides strong support to the hypothesis that the relation between probability of bunching
at the withholding threshold and assets of a firm is inverted-U shaped as predicted by the AT
model of bunching.
Intertemporal Persistence in Bunching and the Pattern of Unbunching
The evidence on the relation between firm size (measured in terms of assets) and the prob-
ability of bunching is suggestive of firms behaving more according to the audit trigger model.
However, firm size is an imperfect proxy for risk preference and risk bearing capacity of a firm.
In this section, we report more definitive tests in terms of persistence in bunching and the
pattern of unbunching. A simple but convincing way to test whether there is strong intertemporal
persistence in bunching before the change in withholding rate in 2007 is to check the proportion
of firms that bunch in all three years (2004-2006) conditional on bunching at least once. The
estimates for three different definitions of bunching are 3.2 percent, 3.6 percent, and 4.5 percent
respectively (see row 1 in Table 6). This is strong evidence against the hypothesis that if a firm
bunches in one year, it should also bunch in the other years if the enforcement and withholding
regime is unchanged, and raises doubts about the LPT model as a description of the central
tendency in the data.25
However, as noted in testable prediction (TP.3.2), a firm that bunched in year t can unbunch
in the year t + 1 under the LPT model when it experiences shocks such that its true refund
switches from negative (in t ) to positive (in t + 1). The testable implication of LPT model in
such cases of unbunching is that they will declare taxes less than the withheld amount in the
year they unbunch. Rows 3 and 5 in Table 6 show the proportion of firms that declare more than
25One can argue that linearity will only be approximately satisfied in the data even if βi = 1, and we should
observe some unbunching. However, the fact that more than 95 percent of the firms unbunch in a span of only
3 years suggests that significant curvature is required in the value function to rationalize this.
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the withheld amount when they unbunch in the year 2005 and 2006 respectively conditional on
bunching in the year before. Given a definition of bunching, we classify a firm as unbunched
when its declared tax/sales ratio in year t+1 falls outside the band of bunching, but the declared
tax/sales ratio in the year t was inside the band. The estimates in row 3 of Table 6 refer to
the firms that bunched in 2004, but unbunched from the withholding threshold in 2005, and 35
percent of the unbunched firms declare taxes higher than the withheld amount. The evidence in
row 5 of Table 6 for the firms that unbunched in 2006 is similar, 40 percent of them declare taxes
higher than the withheld amount. The evidence on the pattern of unbunching thus contradicts
the prediction of the LPT model for about 35-40 percent of the firms.
Take together, the evidence presented above in this section suggests that a substantial pro-
portion of firms (about 40 percent) does not behave according to the linear prospect theory
model where the withholding threshold is a reference point for the taxpayer. Their tax choices
are more consistent with an extended Allingham-Sandmo model where the withholding thresh-
old is a reference point for audit. On the other hand, the evidence on the pattern of unbunching
also cannot reject the linear prospect theory model for about 60 percent of the firms.
8. Conclusions
A substantial body of recent economic literature uses bunching of economic agents at policy
thresholds to understand optimizing behavior. We contribute to this literature both theoretically
and empirically in the context of bunching of profit tax payments by firms at the withholding
threshold. Using quasi-experimental variations in withholding rates across industries and over
time, we show that the bunching observed at the withholding threshold reflects primarily op-
timizing choices of firms rather than a lump in the distribution of profits due to lumps in the
distribution of technology and risk preference. We find that the bunching around the 1 percent
threshold observed in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 vanished in 2007 for only the firms in those
industries where the withholding rate changed from 1 percent to 2 percent in June 2007.
We develop alternative models of bunching of firm’s tax payments that focus on three mech-
anisms of bunching and derive a set of testable predictions. A transaction costs model where
the firms bunch because the costs of claiming refunds are higher than the amount of refund
predicts that none of the firms that bunch would increase its tax payments when withholding
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rate increases. The evidence based on a quasi-experimental increase in the withholding rate
from 1 percent to 2 percent in 2007 in only some industries shows that the firms increased their
tax payments facing a higher withholding rate. This rejects the transactions costs model.
Our analysis shows that it is not possible to generate bunching in tax payments in a prospect
theoretic model with the standard S-shaped power value function of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), the withholding threshold as the reference point and loss aversion. A firm’s tax payments
can bunch at the withholding threshold when preferences are piece-wise linear at both sides of
the reference threshold. The linear prospect theory model yields testable predictions about
intertemporal persistence in bunching and the pattern of unbunching which we test with panel
data. The evidence shows that a large proportion of firms that bunch in a given year unbunch in
the following year which is inconsistent the prediction of intertemporal persistence in bunching
in the LPT model. Among the firms that unbunch from the withholding threshold, about 35-40
percent firms declare taxes more than the withheld amount suggesting that the behavior of these
firms is not consistent with the LPT model.
The analysis and evidence presented in this paper suggest that while the behavior of many
firms conforms to the predictions of the LPT model, there is a substantial proportion of firms
that behaves more according to an expected utility model of evasion where firms face higher
audit risk for claiming positive refunds. The common practice of relying on a single model of
evasion to understand tax choices of firms and to derive cost-benefit estimates of tax policy may
not be appropriate.
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Table 1: Profit-Tax Withholding Rates (as a Fraction of Sales)  
Industry  Jan. 04 to June 07  July 07 to Dec. 07  
      
Construction  0.01  0.02  
Manufacturing  0.01  0.02  
Wholesale and Retail   0.01  0.02  
Transportation  0.01  0.01  
      
Notes: The withholding rates are reported for the period 2004-2007 that correspond to our 
panel data. The rates generally apply to the typical firm in each of the four industries 
above.  
      
      
Table 2: Characteristics of the Firms (Balanced Panel: 2006-2007) 
   2006  2007 
Variable Name Description  Mean St. Dev.  Mean St. Dev. 
        
Sales 
Total sales ($ thousands) reported by firms in 
tax return. 
2,674.
4 26,813.9  3,051.7 28,520.6 
Tax 
Profit-tax ($ thousands) declared by firms in 
tax return. 25.7 331.3  31.9 366.9 
Assets 
Total assets ($ thousands) reported by firms in 
tax return. 
1,556.
5 12,304.7  1,737.7 13,982.9 
Tax / Sales Reported profit-tax as a share of total sales. 0.009 0.019  0.011 0.020 
        
Manufacturing Equals 1 if Manufacturing firm.  0.211 0.408  0.211 0.408 
Construction Equals 1 if Construction firm.   0.093 0.290  0.093 0.290 
Wholesale / Retail  
Equals 1 if Wholesale or Retail Trade 
firm.  0.570 0.495  0.570 0.495 
Transportation Equals 1 if firm Transportation firm.  0.126 0.332  0.126 0.332 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Do Firms Bunch Near the Withholding Rate?   
A) Saez (2010) Test for Bunching During 2004 - 2006 (p-values)  
 
Ba  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0008) 
Bb  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0009) 
Bc  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< .0010) 
    
Contruction  2.6E-18 1.3E-20 1.5E-24 
    
Manufacturing 5.4E-04 7.2E-05 4.2E-06 
    
Retail 3.6E-10 5.3E-13 5.1E-14 
    
Transportation 7.1E-07 1.7E-05 3.9E-06 
    
B) Saez (2010) Test for Bunching During 2006  (p-values)   
 
Ba  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0008) 
Bb  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0009) 
Bc  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< .0010) 
    
Contruction  3.0E-05 8.2E-08 5.0E-12 
    
Manufacturing 0.0099 0.0022 0.0002 
    
Retail 1.1E-06 3.5E-07 1.9E-07 
    
Transportation 2.5E-05 4.8E-04 0.0002 
    
C) Saez (2010) Test for Bunching During 2007  (p-values)   
 
Ba  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0008) 
Bb  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< 
.0009) 
Bc  
1(|tax/sales - 0.01|< .0010) 
    
Construction  0.8618 0.4571 0.5342 
    
Manufacturing 0.7895 0.7618 0.2948 
    
Retail 0.2105 0.7697 0.4771 
    
Transportation 0.0598 0.0137 0.0035 
Notes:  This Table displays p-values of a statistical test under the null hypothesis of "no-bunching" near the 2006 
withholding rate of 0.01.  A firm "bunches" if its reported tax/sales ratio lies within a small distance (ρ) from the 
withholding rate. For robustness, we choose three alternative values for ρ (0.08%, 0.09% and 0.10%) that are 
displayed in each of the columns of the Table. The variable Ba equals one if firm i's tax/sales ratio in 2006 is 
between 0.92% and 1.08%. Similarly, the variables Bb and Bc equal one if the 2006 tax/sales ratio falls within the 
intervals [0.91%, 1.099%] and [0.90%, 1.10%], respectively.  For each of the three bands defined above, two 
symmetric surrounding intervals are computed: [1%-2ρ, 1%-ρ] and [1%+ρ, 1%+2ρ].  P-values are reported above.  
    
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Changes in Reported Taxes and Withholding Rates 
Dependent Variable is the Change in the Firm's Profit Tax / Sales Ratio Between 2007 and 2006 
  Change in δ   Change in δ 
 Yes  No 
Ba: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0008 ) 0.0010 **  0.0000  
 
(0.0004)    
(0.0015)   
Bb: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0009) 0.0010 **  0.0004  
 
(0.0004)    
(0.0014)   
Bc: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0010 ) 0.0011 ***  0.0019  
  (0.0004)     (0.0017)   
Number of Observations 12,082     1,748   
Notes: (1) The estimates show the coefficient of the dummy variable for bunching from a DID design with the firms 
that did not bunch as the comparison group. δ denotes the withholding rate. The first column reports the estimates 
for those industries where the withholding rate increased from 1 to 2 percent in 2007. The second column shows 
estimates for firms with unchanged withholding rate. (2) Regressions include change in assets between 2006 and 
2007 as a control. (3) *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively; estimates 
without any asterisk are not statistically different from zero. 
Table 5A: Bunching and Firm Size: Large Firm Effect 
(The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value 1 when 
a firm bunches at the withholding threshold in 2006.) 
 Ba Bb Bc 
      
         
1 (Assets (t-1) > p75)  -0.015 ***  -0.016 ***  -0.017 *** 
 
(0.0036)    
(0.0038)    
(0.0039)   
1 (Assets (t-1) > p90)  -0.025 ***  -0.030 ***  -0.030 *** 
 
(0.005)    
(0.005)    
(0.005)   
1 (Assets (t-1) > p95) -0.034 ***  -0.040 ***  
-
0.0409 *** 
 
(0.006)    
(0.006)    
(0.0065)   
1 (Assets (t-1) > p99) 
-
0.0481 ***  
-
0.0569 ***  
-
0.0583 *** 
 
(0.0112)    
(0.0112)    
(0.0121)   
         
Number of Observations 28,828     28,828     28,828   
Notes: This Table shows results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable (in each column) is 
independently regressed on the covariates in each row. Assets are measured as the average of 2004 and 2005. The 
independent variable in each regression is an indicator that takes the value of one if a firm’s assets are above a 
specific percentile. For example, 1 (Assets (t-1) > p75) denotes the firms that belong to the right tail above 75th 
percentile of the distribution. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5B: Bunching and Firm Size: Inverted-U? 
(The dependent variable is a binary indicator of bunching that takes 1 when a firm  
bunches near the withholding threshold in 2006.) 
  Ba   Bb   Bc  
          
 Firm Size Rank (t-1) 0.125 ***  0.127 ***  0.147 ***  
 
(0.0218)    
(0.0230)    
(0.0238)    
(Firm Size Rank)2 (t-1) -0.140 ***  -0.146 ***  -0.164 ***  
 
(0.0211)    
(0.0221)    
(0.0230)    
Slope at the Lower 
Bound (1st Percentile) 0.122   0.124   0.144   
 (0.0214) ***  (0.0225) ***  (0.0233) ***  
Slope at the Upper Bound 
(99th Percentile) 
 
-0.152    
 
-0.162    
 
-0.177    
 
(0.0214) 
  
(0.0223) 
  
(0.0232) 
  
Sasabuchi t test 5.70   5.52   6.61   
P-Value 6.09E-09   1.68E-08   3.72E-10   
Extremum Point 0.446   0.435   0.449   
95 Percent Conf. Interval 
(Fieller Method) 
[0.397,0.485] 
  
[0.383,0.475] 
  
[0.404,0.485] 
  
Number of observations 28,828     28,828     28,828   
 
Notes: (1) Firm size is measured in percentile ranks in asset distribution.  The assets are measured as  
the average of 2004 and 2005. (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. (3) The null hypothesis 
for Sasabuchi t test is monotonic relation or U-shape, and the alternative is inverted-U shape. 
 
Table 6: Persistence in Bunching and the Pattern of Unbunching 
  Ba Bb Bc 
    
 Persistent Bunchers (percent) 3.2 3.6 4.5 
    
 Firms that unbunch in 2005 (percent) 70.39 68.61 66.47 
(Among those who bunched in 2004)        
Percent with taxes more than withheld amount in 2005 35.48 35.41 35.55 
(among those who unbunch in 2005)        
 Firms that unbunch in 2006 (percent) 70.1 68.42 65.87 
(Among those who bunched in 2005)    
    
 Percent with taxes more than withheld amount in 2006 39.17 38.7 38.21 
(Among those who unbunched in 2006)       
Notes: The definitions of bunching in three columns are same as in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 1: Profit-Taxes Reported by Construction Firms
Note: Figures show histograms for the tax / sales ratio of Ecuadorian firms in the Construction sector by year. The 
vertical dashed line shows the witholoding rate (1%) that applied to firm's sales in 2004, 2005 and 2006. On average, 
there are 1,449 Construction firms per year in our sample. Part of the distribution has been left out of the graph.
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Figure 2: Profit-Taxes Reported by Manufacturing Firms
Note: Figures show histograms for the tax / sales ratio of Ecuadorian firms in the Manufacturing sector by year. The 
vertical dashed line shows the witholoding rate (1%) that applied to firm's sales in 2004, 2005 and 2006. On average, 
there are 3,192 Manufacturing firms per year in our sample. Part of the distribution has been left out of the graph.
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Figure 3: Profit-Taxes Reported by Wholesale / Retail Firms
Note: Figures show histograms for the tax / sales ratio of Ecuadorian firms in the Retail sector by year. The vertical 
dashed line shows the witholoding rate (1%) that applied to firm's sales in 2004, 2005 and 2006. On average, there are 
8,705 Retail firms per year in our sample. Part of the distribution has been left out of the graph.
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Figure 4: Profit-Taxes Reported by Transport Firms
Note: Figures show histograms for the tax / sales ratio of Ecuadorian firms in the Retail sector by year. The vertical 
dashed line shows the witholoding rate (1%) that applied to firm's sales in 2004, 2005 and 2006. On average, there are 
2,193 Retail firms per year in our sample. Part of the distribution has been left out of the graph.
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Figure 5: Share of Firms that Bunch by Asset Decile 
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Online Appendix: Not for Publication
Proof of Proposition 1
(1.a) Note first that in the model above it is never optimal for a firm to declare that pi∗i > Πi, because
while a taxpayer pays a penalty for underreporting tax liability, they get back $1 in case of audit when
$1 is overreported. So we need to show that there exists Pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀P ≥ Pˆ , it is not optimal
to declare that pi∗i < Πi. Observe that pii ≥ 0, as a firm when making loss cannot ask for negative tax
payments. For pi∗i = Πi, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
dWi
dpii
|pii=Πi ≥ 0 =⇒
[
U
′
i
(
Zbi
)
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
]
pii=Πi
≥ (1− P )
Pθ
⇐⇒ 1 ≥ (1− P )
Pθ
, because pii = Πi ⇒ Zbi = Zgi , ∀ i
⇐⇒ P ≥ (1 + θ)−1 ≡ Pˆ
(1.b) For pi∗i = 0, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
dWi
dpii
|pii=0 ≤ 0 =⇒
[
U
′
i
(
Zbi
)
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
]
pii=0
≤ (1− P )
Pθ
=⇒ P ≤ (1 + θηi)−1 ≡ P˜i, where ηi ≡
[
U
′
i
(
Zbi
)
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
]
pii=0
To see that Pˆ > P˜i , note that
ηi ≡
[
U
′
i
(
Zbi
)
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
]
pii=0
=
[
U
′
i (Πi {1− τ (1 + θ)})
U
′
i (Πi)
]
> 1
The last inequality above follows from the facts that Ui(.) is concave and {1− τ (1 + θ)} < 1.
(1.c) For a risk neutral firm, pi∗i = 0 is the corner solution when P < Pˆ . Now consider a risk averse
firm, when P ∈
(
P˜i, Pˆ
)
. The first order condition in equation (3) of the main text is satisfied in this
case with pi∗i ∈ (0,Πi) . This last statement follows immediately from propositions (1.a) and (1.b). The
last part of (1.c) that the optimal tax declared is higher for a more risk averse firm follows from the
first order condition, and noting that if firm i1 is more risk averse than firm i0, then
U
′
i0 (Z) < U
′
i1 (Z) .
1
Proof of Proposition 2
By definition
µi ≡
[
U
′
i (Z
g
i )
U
′
i
(
Zbi
)]
piiτ=δYi
In other words, µi is the ratio of marginal utility in bad to good states evaluated at the reported
cost that makes the declared taxes exactly equal to the withheld amount. The lower threshold µ˜i is
defined by the following condition:
dWi
dCdi
∣∣∣∣∣∣pii=δYi
τ
≥ 0 =⇒ µi ≥ µ˜i ≡ P2θ
(1− P2)
Thus µ˜i is the critical value that determines whether a firm finds it optimal to report costs high enough
to make the refund positive when facing probability of audit P2. First consider the case when P1 > Pˆ .
In this case for any firm with Ψ˜i > δ and µi ≥ µ˜i bunch at the withholding threshold. The proof
follows from an application of the results in proposition (1) and noting that given the discontinuity in
the audit function at the threshold, it is not optimal for a firm with i ∋ µi ≥ µ˜i to claim a tax liability
lower than the threshold, because it is optimal to declare pi∗i = Πi facing probability of audit P1 > Pˆ .
When P1 < Pˆ , proposition (1.c) implies that any risk neutral firm declares pi
∗
i = 0, and among the
risk averse firms there is a subset that finds it optimal to evade taxes and declare pi∗i ∈ (0,Πi) . This
implies that some risk averse firms that bunched at the withholding threshold under the case P1 > Pˆ
would now declare tax liability below the threshold facing P1 < Pˆ . To identify the set of firms that
bunch at the threshold we thus need to define a upper bound such that the following holds:
dWi
dCdi
∣∣∣∣∣∣pii=δYi
τ
≤ 0 =⇒ µi ≤ µ˘i ≡ P1θ
(1− P1)
Thus the set of firms that bunch at the threshold under the assumption that P1 < Pˆ is defined as
i ∈ (µ˜i, µ˘i).
2
